SOURCE: TNN BLOG
India’s nuclear deterrence has survived until now in spite of the Indo-China tense standoff since last six months. Massive PLA mobilisation has created an unprecedented security scenario for the first time after the 1962 war. That means that the existing Nuclear Doctrine has served its aim.
However, an examination of the existing doctrine will indicate that with the fast changing security dynamics in this region and the new emerging technologies, there is a requirement for upgrading the existing doctrine and the need for fast tracking it’s ‘Development and Force Structuring’, which give intrinsic stability. This may negate the risk of deterrence hanging on a slender thread.
This poses a few questions on India’s existing nuclear posturing, which is correlated to its existing doctrine. Is there is a case to factor the Power of ‘Nuclear Deterrence’ in our National Security Strategy to offset the conventional asymmetry with the adversary-like drawing thresholds to support war-fighting etc. ? Is there a need to change the ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy, when facing a stronger adversary? Is the present operational doctrine, sufficient to tackle twin collusive threats in a volatile security environment? Do newer technologies demand a more proactive and ‘Launch-on-Warning’ category of doctrine? Because India’s current Nuclear Doctrine is more unidirectional oriented and appears ambiguous to cater to duel threats. It lacks a National Mission. This poses a strategic dilemma. The ibid doctrine does not spell out contingencies with exactitude. The doctrine is silent on the aspects of war fighting.
This consequently, affects sequentially on building future nuclear capacities. The operationalization of the nuclear arsenal, the type of targeting, Command and Control and flexible response capability, are all derivatives of the correct nuclear mission. This mission thereafter dictates the preparation and application of the Nuclear Forces for National Security Objectives. There are four options for the application of nuclear power. First, the national policy and doctrine for ’No First Use’ (NFU) or the ‘First use’ (FU).The second, is the decision to engage counter-value targets or the counter-force targets; Thirdly, the need for flexible and immediate response or only the pre-planned counter value (political bomb) targeting. Yet another aspect, which needs clarity, is the issue of thresholds, which are linked to ground military operations and thus become force multipliers to the military’s mission.
Nuclear Doctrine: 2003
India’s official nuclear doctrine, released by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 2003, states a posture of “NFU” and in case of a first-strike by the adversary, it promises retaliation that is “Massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage”. The current doctrine, therefore has built on the following organisational capacities and characteristics: (i) Firstly, ‘Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence’ with adequate retaliatory capability, if deterrence fails. (ii) Secondly, due to the policy of ‘retaliation only’, the survivability of the arsenal becomes critical. Thus their need for security and concealment becomes .mandatory.(iii)Thirdly, India’s peacetime posture is aimed at convincing any potential aggressor that: any nuclear attack on India will invite “massive” retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.(iv) It further qualifies, that deterrence requires India should always maintain sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, a robust command and control system backed by effective intelligence and early warning capabilities. It further says that to fulfil this India should have ‘Triad’ capabilities. (v) Lastly, it spells out that Nuclear weapons will be tightly controlled and released at the highest level. It is also observed that in the initial draft of the doctrine made in 1999, the retaliation was to be only “Punitive”. However, in 2003 later it was reworded to read “Massive”, which clearly indicates that India wanted to preclude the option of nuclear use against its adversaries. This was also aligned with India’s objective of relying on its conventional capability to enable strategic deterrence by a punishment strategy through the Indian Strike Corps. This has always provided the conventional edge to India and has been a preferred option against Pakistan. However now, the nuclearisation of the sub-continent has changed this landscape. Pakistan’s ‘FU’ doctrine and incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons in its force posture needs a call for further substitution of the “massive retaliation” concept with a more “graduated” or “flexible” retaliation and “Counter-Force” type of military targeting. There is a case for evolving newer doctrines like of ‘Extended Deterrence” or “Limited Deterrence” But such philosophies go against the grain in the current nuclear doctrine because unlike the “massive” formulation, the “Graduated or Limited” response allows control of the Escalation Ladder. This facilitates ability to leverage an advantage for military gains, rather than going straight for “Counter-Value” targeting of cities. Coupled with the policy of ‘Escalation Control’ measures, there is a need for issue of guidelines for quantification and proportionality in terms of weapons yields and numbers. This will then dictate the inventory of future arsenals and also the ‘Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle’ (MIRV) capability and research for Fourth Generation/Fifth Generation nuclear warheads. . In addition, recapitulating the history of nuclear weapons and its parlance would help, in better understanding for decision-making.
Historical Argument & Way Ahead
During the Cold War and détente between the USA and erstwhile USSR, many European strategists speculated many defence postures that included the ability to use effective force. Thus, many terms were coined. Intermediate Deterrence theory was propagated by Buzard; Intermediate Courses by Liddell Hart; the Middle Game by Strachey; Measured Retaliation by Healy. Buzzards of “Graduated Deterrence” propagated the most practical theory. However, Bernard Brodie who had expressed the tenets of nuclear war stated: ‘Nuclear War is Unwinnable’. What has to be really examined is, that will the theory of deterrence holds in the future too, for the developing nations of the Asian subcontinent? In the present fast detieorating Indo-Pacific environment with the US-china, rivalry in ascendency and India being the pivot in Asia as perceived by the USA is causing geo-political ripples in the China-ASEAN inter-states relationships. The emergence of QUAD in this region is yet another evolving architecture for security and freedom in this theatre. It is in the formative stage and as an annexure; the unspoken ‘Nuclear-Alliance’ between the states is bound to develop as part of an overarching Indo-Pacific strategy. This is again advantage India and will in fact strengthen the nuclear deterrence and nuclear stability in this region. Therefore, there is a need to do a closer examination of the current doctrine to ensure that India judiciously employs the currency of nuclear weapons so as to ensure a ‘A zero Sum Game’ when facing a duel threat(Pakistan-China nexus).In case of a singular threat, the said new doctrine should enable India, a clear edge over Pakistan. As regards China, the said new doctrine should be worded differently to ensure a “No War Matrix” equation. It could also talk of a ‘Nuclear Alliance Matrix’ (As discussed above) so added as a “Third Strike Force”. When such a ‘Force-Mix’ is added to this equation then a very complex nuclear matrix emerges in the Indo-Pacific Theatre, again with advantage India. Remember, nuclear war is unwinnable. The exercise of additions and subtractions of nuclear Warheads is only a theoretical figure. Because in reality it is only a mind game. However, ironically and truly, this actually affects and paves way for peace. The said discussed alliance mix, adds to India’s deterrence capability even against a twin threat. This will then shut the China conventional superiority argument over India at least for the next two decades. (There will be no more Doklams and Galwan incidents).This advantage will give adequate space to India for achieving its strategic objectives. This is just a school of thought and needs validation and debate. Thus, it can be said that these arguments and these equations are theoretical and may promote the deterrence stability to hold good between India and China. Otherwise alternatively, if status quo in the doctrine is maintained, then China will continue to enjoy overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority over India, thus compelling India not to use Nuclear Weapons in case of a conventional military defeat? This issue needs more deliberation by military planners. With India now having a CDS, such introspection is possible on a fast track and is mandatory. There is a definite requirement of delineating geographic thresholds across the LAC/LOC and the same be dovetailed with the Limits of Penetration in the overall defence battle. These have to be decided by the military and that it should augment the defensibility of Strategic Objectives. The construction of the CPEC through Pakistan has yet added another dimension to the security calculus where Pak-China collusiveness is bound to synergise more and more.
