Unanswered questions remain about India’s preparedness for such an eventuality
Ajai Shukla
Trade Standard, Nov 4, 22
Inaugurating a new production line last Sunday in Vadodara, Gujarat, where Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) will build C-295 transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF) in technology partnership with Airbus Defense and Space, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke about his vision of “atmanirbharta.” India, he said, would soon be a huge maker of transport aircraft, having abandoned the previous government’s “band-aid approach” where the manufacturing sector barely survived on subsidies.
Still, serious questions remain about the Indian military’s capabilities, and whether it could prevail in the two-front war that analysts anticipate, with China waging its version of a “computerized war”, in which killer robots, piloted and enhanced by artificial intelligence, machine learning and quantum computing quickly challenged a more conventionally conducted Indian army. Many believe such a war is unlikely, as China would not want to be seen as needing Pakistani help to slap a smaller and weaker India. Even so, an opportunistic Pakistani army might not miss the opportunity to jump into the fray. So there remain unanswered questions as to whether India is equipped and prepared for such an eventuality, or whether our military would go into battle in 2022-23 using tactics and equipment very similar to those they used during the Kargil conflict in 1999. What exactly changed; and what really need?
First, a key development that has transformed the modern battlefield – as seen in previews in Azerbaijan-Armenia and also in Ukraine – is the new threat to ground forces posed by unmanned vehicles (RPVs), or armed drones, which are driven by ultra -modern technologies. These pose a powerful threat to Indian forces, including those in depth. Armed drones, released to operate by the early destruction of enemy air defense weapon systems, can leap over enemy forward defenses to strike their reserve echelons, tactical infrastructure such as quarters generals and communication nodes, logistical units such as munitions dumps, and geographic bottlenecks that force troops to concentrate, presenting lucrative targets. As Pakistan enjoys at rough parity with India in legacy weapon systems, it is beginning to enjoy superiority in drone warfare, thanks to RPVs supplied by China, including the Wing Loong and RPVs obtained from Iran and Turkey.
India does not yet have a doctrine to counter these new threats, nor a strategy to underpin a response framework. Even as China perfects its strategy and implements fifth-generation warfare, our acquisition of drones and counter-drone systems continues to falter on sloppy procurement policies. One of the main reasons for the absence of tactical and operational doctrine for drones is the woeful absence of a National Security Strategy (NSS), essential for formulating strategic, operational and tactical concepts which, in turn, would shape the development of strength. . Without a technically competent National Security Advisor (NSA) who can lead policymaking at the top level, the military won’t even know what war to prepare for.
It is evident that the current NSA does not place a high priority on developing an NSS, having pushed the responsibility onto the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), the Department of Military Affairs (DMA ) and various scientific establishments such as the Defense R&D Organization. This is undesirable, as the CDS, since the conception of this position in 1999, was geared towards the structuring, procurement, integration and reorganization of three-service forces from existing single-service theaters into single-service commands. three integrated services.
Another critical weakness of India lies in what has been dubbed “grey zone warfare”: which involves information, disinformation, cyber-attacks, the collection of electronic intelligence, signals and satellites and the modification of historical archives, as has been the case in Tawang, Doklam and Ladakh to find a Jus ad Bellum (justification of a war). Chinese special forces could also sever undersea internet cables, leaving India isolated and unable to communicate safely with its allies.
China’s (and to an increasing extent, Pakistan’s) dominance over India’s wartime military is not limited to high-tech areas such as artificial intelligence. It is also evident in conventional areas, such as long range lights to support ground operations. In this, Indian forces that need fire to support ground operations have little choice apart from Pinaka rockets and BrahMos cruise missiles. Meanwhile, Pakistan has acquired or developed the Hatf series of missiles and a cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Indian ballistic missiles would be a form of deterrence, if only China would leave command and control systems functioning.
The government, instead of filling these gaps, dismisses the concerns of the military. At the 2015 Combined Commanders Conference, held on INS Vikramaditya, Mr Modi collectively asked the attending commanders what they saw as India’s main military threat. When generals, air marshals and admirals said they saw China as India’s most likely threat, Mr Modi would have done well to present to generals, admirals and air marshals some of the principles of computer warfare. Instead, he wisely said, “You may believe it but, from my point of view, I believe that China is not a military threat to India at all.
Less than two years later, Indian troops were in direct confrontation with Chinese troops at Doklam, Sikkim. Five years later, the Prime Minister found himself faced with large-scale Chinese troop incursions into eastern Ladakh, the death of 20 Indian soldiers and the loss of significant Indian territory in the area of Depsang, at the northern tip of Ladakh.
Along with these drawbacks, an important and often overlooked military advantage that India has against China is the resilience and combat quality of our combat forces. The hardships soldiers face in high mountain terrain strain even the most rugged among them. By contrast, the average Chinese soldier is a lonely male child, pampered by a doting family and ill-prepared for the dangers and discomforts of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
During the confrontation in Doklam, Sikkim, where Indian and Chinese soldiers were lined up, senior Indian commanders said they could sense uncertainty in the Chinese line. As the Indian soldiers were to be restrained – verbally and physically – from pushing back the Chinese troops, our chief interpreter heard the Chinese officers at the rear of their line threatening to open fire on any of their soldiers who hesitated or would step out of line. .
This man-to-man advantage enjoyed by Indian LAC jawans over relatively comfort-loving Chinese soldiers would be eroded once the ranks of hardened jawans, conscripted for long terms, were diluted by significant numbers of self -so-called Agniveers – enlisted soldiers for short four-year terms. Of these, only 20% (25,000 soldiers of the batch of 125,000 each year) will be kept in service for long terms. Generals fear that as the percentage of Agniveers increases, the hard side of the army will soften.
The only redeeming factor is that in any war with China, India would not be alone. With its growing relations with Indo-Pacific democracies such as Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, New Delhi would react to inevitable setbacks by quickly aligning and combining its forces with the AUKUS and Quadrilateral groupings. China would see its forces split in two directions – the land border with India and the maritime theater of the South China Sea. Manipulating diplomatic and strategic levers in this conundrum would be a major challenge for New Delhi.
